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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
of the centuries-old office of Sheriff,""1 and concludes that, "Such a provision
has nothing whatever to do with the negligent handling of a county-owned
automobile which happens to be driven by a county employee paid by the
county but carrying the title of 'deputy sheriff.' "12
It should be noted that two judges, Van Voorhis and Foster, concurred
with Judge Froessel's opinion, and that two judges concurred with Chief Judge
Desmond in his dissenting opinion. The seventh, Judge Dye, concurs only in
the result as to the county upon the ground that the evidence is insufficient as
a matter of law to establish the negligence of the deputy. It is questionable
whether Judges Van Voorhis and Foster should have concurred in Judge
Froessel's holding as to the constitutional issue, since in their dissenting opinion
they voted to reverse as to the deputy because of insufficient evidence. Thus,
they were not required to pass on the constitutional liability of the county.
However, this case does illustrate that the Court is evenly divided in their
interpretation of the county immunity clause.
In view of the constitutional history and the lower court's seemingly consistent holdings as to the immunity of the county for the acts of a sheriff or
his deputies,13 it would appear that a great deal of reliance has been put on this
interpretation of Article IX, Section 5. Judge Froessel seems to state the wisest
course to follow when he says, "to hold the county liable in this case for the
acts of the Sheriff would require us to cast aside the mandate of the Constitution and shift the liability from the surety to the county, which the Constitution directs shall never be responsible. This may not be done without recourse to a constitutional amendment."- 4
EXISTING E=RGE~cy RENT CONTOLS

JUSTFIED

In the matter of Lincoln Building Associates v. ame,' 5 the petitioner
landlord challenged the constitutionality of the 1959 re-enactment and extension' 8 of the Emergency Business Rent Control Law. 17 Petitioner claimed
the statutes violated the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions' 8 and the federal obligation of contracts clause,' 9 in that the emergency
upon which the statute was enacted no longer existed and hence the action of
11. Id. at 124, 202 N.Y.S2d 295.
12. Ibid.
13. Iserean v. Stone, 3 A.D.2d 247, 160 N.Y..2d 336 (4th Dept 1957); Hawkins v.
Dominy, 18 Misc. 2d 221, 185 N.Y.S.2d 310 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Schnitzer v. County of Erie,
8 Misc. 2d 989, 168 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Mentillo v. County of Cayuga, 2
Misc. 2d 820, 150 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
14. Supra note 7 at 123, 202 N.Y.S2d 294 (1960).
15. 8 N.Y.2d 179, 203 N.Z.S.2d 86 (1960).
16. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 809.
17. Ibid. It should be noted that the Emergency Business Rent Control Law is
applicable only in cities of the state having a population of more than one million, thus
only affecting New York City.
18. N.Y. Const. Art. 1, §§ 6, 11; US. Const. Amend. XIV.
19. U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 10.
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the Legislature was not justified. The Attorney General, appearing in the
proceeding pursuant to Section 71 of the Executive Law,20 filed a general denial.
The same landlord had previously challenged the constitutionality of the
1955 re-enactment and extension 21 in Lincoln Building Associates v. Barr.22
There the court dismissed the petition but stated that rent controls have
justification only in periods of emergency and left open the question of how
long the Legislature may lawfully continue the office rent control. Subsequent to the Barr decision the Legislature effected a gradual relaxation of
controls by systematically reducing the amount of rent required to make office
space applicable for decontrol under the 1956 amendment.23
The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Municipal Court of the
City of New York,2 4 which had dismissed the petition, stating that petitioner's
evidence only showed that the intensity of the emergency ... "has moderated
to some extent but not in substantial degree."25 The Court noted that such
a process of gradual cessation of controls avoided economic disruption and
dislocation and held that such determination of the Legislature was not
arbitrary or a violation of constitutional guarantees. The dissenting opinion,
argued as it did in the Barr case, that the act in question was an excessive use
of the police power in an emergency, as defined by the United States Supreme
Court,2 6 and resulted in the violation of an individual's constitutional rights.
The dissent stressed that the emergency which gave rise to the act, namely
conditions of war, no longer existed, urging a distinction between conditions
caused by war and those resulting from a general prosperity in which both
tenants and landlords share.
It appears that the Business Rent Control Law will eventually disappear;
the decision indicating judicial approval of the legislative process of gradual
cessation of controls. Such a gradual process, the Court feels, is in line with
the stated purpose of the act "to protect and promote public health, safety
and general welfare."
DELEGATION OF POWER TO MUNICIPALITY TO TAX LiMTED

Article 3, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution confers on the
Legislature the exclusive power to levy taxes and to determine the class of
persons to be taxed provided such classification has a reasonable basis. The
20. N.Y. Executive Law § 71:
Whenever the constitutionality of a statute is brought into question . . . the
court or justice before whom such action or proceeding is pending may make an
order, directing the party desiring to raise such question to serve notice thereof on
the attorney-general and that the attorney-general be permitted to appear at
such trial or hearing in support of the constitutionality of such statute.
21. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, Chap. 701.
22. 1 N.Y.2d 413, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1956).
23. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, ch. 735, §§ 2, 3.
24. 21 Misc. 2d 500, 196 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Mun. Ct. 1960).
25. Supra note 15 at 181, 203 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1960).
26. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922).
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